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
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUL 2000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

CONGO

Protracted efforts to achieve a formal cease-fire in Katanga resulted, on 13 October, in a tentative agreement between Tshombé and UN representative Mahmoud Khiari. The proposed agreement includes provisions for a prisoner exchange, originally set for 16 October; for the evacuation by the UN of several strong points in Elisabethville; for retention by Tshombé of garrisons in northern Katanga; and for military inspection teams to visit the installations of each side.

The most controversial point of the proposed agreement, Article 10, states that a counter-attack by Katangan forces against an attack from "the exterior" would not constitute a violation of the cease-fire. This article, generally interpreted to mean an attack by the central government, caused consternation among UN officials both in Leopoldville and New York. Khiari on 16 October flew to Leopoldville to explain the terms to Congolese officials and foreign diplomats. Premier Adoula issued a public statement expressing his apprehension regarding the terms, which he stated would reinforce Tshombé's position, and implicitly urged that the UN not ratify the agreement.

UN headquarters' failure to date to confirm the terms has delayed implementation of the agreement and has increased bitterness in Elisabethville. UN representative O'Brien on 16 October denounced Tshombé for not implementing the prisoner exchange, while Tshombé stated that he would not carry out the agreement until it was

ratified by the UN. In New York, Congolese Foreign Minister Bombo on 17 October attacked the proposed cease-fire and hinted that the Congo might seek Soviet aid in launching an offensive to crush Tshombé.

Apart from the terms of the cease-fire, the military stalemate in Katanga is a setback to both the UN and the central government in their efforts to defeat Katanga's secession. Tshombé on 18 October carried out his commitment to send two emissaries to negotiate with the central government. In the wake of his "victory" over the UN, however, he is unlikely to accept any formula put forth by Adoula which involves Katanga's reintegration with the Congo. The current impasse is embarrassing to Adoula, who has associated his government with the UN venture in Katanga. Although Adoula has indicated an awareness of the logistical pitfalls inherent in any Congo Army "invasion" of Katanga, he will be under increased pressure from radical elements of his government to take tough action against Tshombé.




On 13 October, four Dornier-28 light transports--flown from West Germany--passed through Libreville, Gabon, en route to Katanga. With these, Tshombé probably now has at least five Dorniers at airfields in southern Katanga. [REDACTED] Tshombé's efforts to develop additional airstrips capable of handling jets. [REDACTED]

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Elsewhere, Vice Premier Gizenga--who had been scheduled to return from Stanleyville to Leopoldville on 14 October--may be carrying on political consultations with hard-core supporters in Orientale Province. Although many of Gizenga's former aides have now taken posts in the Adoula government, Gizenga may still hope to form an "opposition" with a view to supplanting Adoula. Any such move would be handicapped by Gizenga's reluctance to spend much time in Leopoldville, as well as by problems in obtaining financial assistance from abroad. Most of Gizenga's erstwhile foreign allies--including the USSR and the UAR--are seeking accreditation from the Adoula government.



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